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TORTIOUS Toxics
LISA HEINZERLING* & CAMERON POWERS HOFFMANt
In this Article we offer one small idea with potentially large
implications. We propose the recognition and development of a special
tort for toxic exposures, where the exposures have not yet led to a physical
illness such as cancer. We argue, in brief, that this new tort would, in one
simple step, accomplish three things: it would address many of the
problems with the courts' current handling of toxic torts; it would
consolidate the many overlapping causes of action now pressed in toxic
tort cases into one single claim; and it would give expression to the real
injury motivating these cases-a dignitary and autonomy-based harm, not
a physical one.
In Part I, we briefly canvass the familiar problems with the courts'
current approaches to handling toxic tort cases. These problems range
from the difficulty of showing causation to the courts' hostility to
acknowledging emotional harm as an injury cognizable in tort. The
problems also stem from the overlapping and duplicative nature of many
toxic tort claims. The profusion of different legal claims arising from the
same basic kinds of factual settings--claims based on harm to quality of
life, emotional distress, enhanced risk, medical monitoring, post-traumatic
stress disorder, damage to property values and others-calls to mind
weeds growing chaotically in a vacant lot. But, we will suggest, all of
these claims are bound by a common theme; they all grow out of the dread
that follows substantial exposures to toxic substances.
In Part H, we discuss the extensive psychological and sociological
literature on the special nature of the dread associated with exposure to
toxic substances. As we will explain, risk itself can corrode communities'
and individuals' sense of security and autonomy, regardless of whether
anyone dies or falls physically ill. The sociologist Kai Erikson uses the
term "chronic disaster" to refer to the cumulative, insidious, gradual harm
that is characteristic of prolonged exposure to hazardous substances.'
Cognitive psychologists, too, as we shall see, have noticed that people
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reserve an uncommon dread for the kinds of circumstances that typically
surround exposures to toxic substances.
This Article thus has a second purpose in addition to proposing a
new toxic tort: this purpose is to bring into the literature on torts relevant
research from cognitive psychology and sociology. This psychological
and sociological literature has been extremely important in contemporary
academic discussions of environmental law.2 Remarkably, however,
despite the obvious connections between the literature on dread and the
human impulses that lead to toxic tort suits, so far other scholars have not
brought the psychological and sociological literature to bear on the
problem of toxic torts.
Part II takes a first cut at exploring the implications, for tort
doctrine, of this psychological and sociological literature on risk.
Throughout this section, we try to show what this literature reveals about
what's wrong with current doctrine. Perhaps most obviously, this
literature shows that the injuries from exposures to toxic substances-even
in advance of any physical disease-are real and widespread. So
widespread are they, in fact, that they might be said to comprise a kind of
"syndrome," predictable and consistent in its manifestations. At the least,
the reality and widespread nature of these injuries suggests that the off-
hand dismissal of such injury by some courts is based on ignorance rather
than evidence. In addition, this literature suggests that the legal system's
growing preoccupation with the numerical expression of risk misses the
concerns underlying the legal claims based on toxic exposures. Finally,
the emerging idea that fear of latent diseases is not recoverable in tort, but
fear of acute near-misses is, is exactly backwards: it is precisely when we
do not know we are safe that we have the most to fear.
The Article ends, in Part HI, on a positive note, with suggestions
about the way tort doctrine should develop in order to take account of the
non-legal literature on risk. The first suggestion is to decouple the notion
of "risk" and risk-based harms from numerical probabilities of physical
injuries, and to cease making recovery in tort dependent on a showing of a
specific numerical probability of harm. The second suggestion is to
recognize the real basis of the true toxic tort (that is, the tort that exists
before physical injury has manifested itself). This tort is an autonomy-
and dignitary-based tort, not a tort based on physical injury. In this way,
the tort's closest cousins are not negligence and strict liability, but instead
battery, assault, and trespass.
2 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993).
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I. CURRENT LAW
Persons exposed to toxic substances have brought a diverse array
of legal claims, including claims based on emotional distress, post-
traumatic stress disorder, decreased quality of life, property damage,
increased risk, fear, and medical monitoring. Yet, regardless of the
specific rubric under which they actually bring their claims, plaintiffs
bringing toxic exposure cases have consistently stumbled over several
large obstacles to judicial relief, intrinsically tied to the nature of their
injury. For example, if plaintiffs wait until they develop physical disease
before they sue, they are faced with problems of muddled and convoluted
chains of causation and long latency periods (which further complicate
causation).3 Yet if plaintiffs sue before they develop disease, they are
faced with the courts' hostility to tort recovery for non-physical harms.
Moreover, if plaintiffs sue before they have developed physical disease,
they may be barred by the single controversy rule from suing later, should
they develop a disease; 4 but if they wait to sue, they may find that the
statute of limitations has passed. Toxic tort plaintiffs thus find themselves
caught in a variety of Catch-22's.
Our focus will be on the tort doctrines that have frustrated (or,
more rarely, allowed) recovery for "exposure-only" plaintiffs-that is,
plaintiffs who have not yet manifested a physical disease due to their
exposure to toxic substances. Toxic exposure victims have brought suit
under a wide variety of legal theories, with, as we shall see, decidedly
mixed success. We briefly canvass the most common claims, and their
judicial fates, here.
Negligent infliction of mental distress. Early tort law categorically
denied emotional distress recovery.5 However, courts eventually began to
allow recovery for emotional harms, but only where those harms were
parasitic to some more tangible, physical harm.6 This requirement
See, e.g., Mark Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation. A Proposal for
Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 797, 811-12 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Marc J. Veilleux, Note, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of
Cancer Under the Jones Act. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 12 TUL. MAR. L.J.
219, 220 (1987).
5 Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 141 (1992) ("The fear of
imaginary injuries and fictitious suits, the belief in self-responsibility for mental well-
being, the difficulty of monetarily valuing emotional harms, the lack of tools and
standards for measurement of emotional ills, and the nascent state of behavioral sciences
all combined to precluded recovery for emotional suffering.").
6 Id. at 142.
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eventually "yielded to the requirement that the plaintiff establish a
physical manifestation of the emotional injury, and many courts still
require that the emotional distress suffered be 'serious. '
7
As the years passed, many courts began to allow recovery for the
"bystander" to a physically harmful event, so long as the bystander had
been within the "zone of danger"of the event. 8 In other words, so long as
the plaintiff could have been physically hurt by the event that ended up
emotionally hurting her, she could recover for her emotional injury in at
least some jurisdictions. Even in the relatively few jurisdictions that have
abandoned the "zone of danger" rule, plaintiffs must still meet certain
requirements concerning proximity in time and space, and the closeness of
the relationship between the person physically hurt and the person
emotionally injured. Though the understanding and application of these
requirements varies among courts, the underlying intent is the same-to
assuage the courts' deep-seated fear of a deluge of frivolous and
unsubstantiated claims.9
Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of
toxic exposure, like all emotional distress claims, must meet the same
physical harm or impact requirements in most jurisdictions.'0 However, as
the physical injuries suffered are often latent and difficult to directly
attribute to a particular cause, this requirement creates a problem for toxic
exposure plaintiffs. With few exceptions," the judicial system has
7 Id. at 170 (citations omitted). Courts have explained that serious emotional distress
exists where "a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately
cope with mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928 (1980).
8 The Supreme Court has embraced the "zone of danger" rule under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
9 See Veilleux, supra note 4, at 222 ("Perhaps the largest obstacle to recovery for
emotional distress or mental anguish is the potential for trivial, feigned, or imagined
claims. In response to these policy reservations, a plaintiff is often required to prove
some physical injury or physical impact that caused or accompanied the emotional
distress or mental anguish.") (citations omitted). However, the requirements described in
text are often rendered somewhat meaningless in application as the judicial systems lacks
any sort of consistent standard for what may constitute the necessary injury. As the
California Supreme Court noted: "[i]f physical injury, however slight, provides the ticket
for admission to the courthouse, it is difficult for advocates of the 'floodgates'
?Oremonition to deny that the doors are already wide open." Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928.
See Veilleux, supra note 4, at 222 n.22 ("Jurisdictions which require proof of some
physical harm as a precondition to recovery are in the majority .... ).
I See, e.g., Lilley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 735 So. 2d 696, 703 (La. Ct.
App. 1999) (upholding plaintiffs claim for asbestos exposure regardless of the existence
of a physical injury).
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demonstrated a clear trend of outright rejection of most emotional distress
claims arising from toxic exposure without accompanying physical
harm. 12 Thus, exposure victims are often faced with two unappetizing
options: bring their true injury of emotional distress alone and face the
likelihood of judicial rejection of their claim; or exaggerate physical
symptoms in an attempt to manipulate the unaccommodating judicial
system and get their claim into court.'
3
Fear. Some jurisdictions have allowed recovery for the fear of
developing latent disease from exposure to harmful substances, a fear
often known as "cancerphobia."' 14 This claim is derived from the "more
commonly recognized claim for emotional distress or mental anguish."'
' 5
Indeed, it is hard to see a difference between the two kinds of claims.
Courts have not thus far required that the plaintiffs bringing fear claims
demonstrate a probability that they will actually develop the illness they
fear.' 6 Even so, the courts are unwilling to allow the new tort to develop
completely independent of the probability of physical disease. Plaintiffs
bringing a fear claim must demonstrate, as a threshold, physical
manifestations of their fear, akin to the physical impact necessary for
traditional emotional distress claims, again in an attempt to weed out
12 See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckey, 521 U.S. 424, 430 (1997)
(listing a variety of cases dismissing emotional distress claims for lack of physical
injury).
See Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1113, (1995) (discussing the same problem in regard to cancerphobia specifically).
Requiring proof of physical injury is particularly problematic in the
context of cancerphobia claims, where the underlying physical injury is
the cancer that has yet to develop. This harm can almost never be
shown .... As a result, retaining the physical harm requirement in
cancerphobia actions serves only to confuse and distort cancerphobia
claims. Although proponents of the physical harm requirement laud its
fraud-preclusion function, the requirement actually encourages victims
to: exaggerate sick headaches, nausea, insomnia and other symptoms
in order to make out a technical basis of bodily injury upon which to
predicate a recovery for the more grievous disturbance ....
Id. at 1120.
14 The term cancerphobia comes from the case of Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E. 2d 249,
251 (N.Y. 1958) (defining cancerphobia as "the phobic apprehension that she would
ultimately develop cancer"). For a further discussion of cancerphobia specifically, see
Donath, supra note 13.
15 Veilleux, supra note 4, at 221.
16 Id. at 223 n.34 (citing Heider v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 231 So. 2d 438 (La.
Ct. App. 1970), as an example of a case where the plaintiff was able to recover for fear
on a very limited probability-there was only a two to five percent chance he would
develop epilepsy from his concussion).
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frivolous cases. Needless to say, this requirement results in a "perverse
incentive structure," wherein it is beneficial to plaintiffs to fabricate
physical harm. 17 Unfortunately, as a result, the ability to recover for fear
may be based largely on "the plaintiffs physiological idiosyncrasies;"' 8
those with meritorious claims often go uncompensated, while those prone
to theatrics may be rewarded.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Closely related to (perhaps
fundamentally indistinguishable from) claims based on emotional distress
and fear are claims based on allegations that plaintiffs who have faced
prolonged exposure to toxic substances suffer from post-traumatic stress
disorder ("PTSD"). These claims have not fared well in the courts. While
PTSD is now a recognized and accepted psychiatric disorder within the
realm of psychiatry, courts have categorically refused to recognize
claims for PTSD arising out of toxic exposure. The attitude of the court in
Sterling v. Velsicol2 ° is not atypical. In affirming the dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims based on PTSD, the court explained:
Plaintiffs' drinking or otherwise using contaminated water,
even over an extended period of time, does not constitute
the type of recognizable stressor identified either by
professional medical organizations or courts. Examples of
stressors upon which courts have based awards for PTSD
include rape, assault, military combat, fires, floods,
earthquakes, car and airplane crashes, torture, and even
internment in concentration camps, each of which are
natural or man-made disasters with immediate or extended
violent consequences. Whereas consumption of
contaminated water may be an unnerving occurrence, it
does not rise to the level of the type of psychologically
traumatic event that is a universal stressor.2
Increased risk. Increased risk, conceptually similar to the newly
recognized loss of chance tort, arises where a defendant's negligence
increases the probability that the plaintiff will suffer a particular physical
17 Donath, supra note 13, at 1124.
18 Id.
19 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) for definitions, diagnostic features, and criteria.
20 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1987).
21 Id. at 1210 (citations omitted).
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harm or disease. The harm or risk created is, in theory, statistically
measurable with "some degree of medical certainty. Plaintiffs allege
future damages, including 'future medical expenses, loss of earnings, and
diminished life expectancy.' 22 Importantly, in recognizing increased risk
as a cause of action, courts are, for the first time, recognizing the protected
interest of being free from future harm, "devoid of both certainty and
existing physical harm. 23  For toxic exposure plaintiffs, this is a
significant step forward.
Plaintiffs pursuing this new course, however, still run into the same
difficulties inherent in the more traditional causes of action; they must
meet the unrealistically high numerical probability standard and they must
time their claim so as not to run into preclusion and statutes of limitations.
In order to limit recovery for increased risk, the courts fall back onto their
traditional causation standards and require a pure probability, or more
likely than not standard of proof. This rule has hugely arbitrary and
inequitable results in the realm of increased risk as, medically speaking,
"the probability of developing a future disease is unlikely to exceed fifty
percent., 24  While it is perhaps comforting to the judiciary to have a
bright-line numerical cut-off, analytically25 and equitably, the application
of this rule in toxic exposure cases is difficult to defend. The result is that
a substantial portion, if not a large majority, of toxic exposure victims go
uncompensated, rendering the development of the increased risk claim
essentially meaningless.26
Further, where toxic exposure plaintiffs are able to bring increased
risk claims, they once again run into the Catch-22 of preclusion. As many
courts assume that the increased risk and-the latent disease that potentially
develops therefrom arise from the same harm, plaintiffs face a no-win
situation. They may bring an increased risk claim, but may then be barred
from bringing additional claims if and when they manifest an illness. In
22 Donath, supra note 13, at 1116 (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 25 Cal.
R3ptr. 2d 550, 588 (1993) (George, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Levit, supra note 5, at 157.
24 Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A
Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635, 639 (1985).
25 See Levit, supra note 5, at 177 ("Analytically, it is difficult to justify insulating a
defendant who has caused a forty-nine percent risk while imposing liability on a
defendant who has caused a fifty-one percent risk of harm.").
26 Some jurisdictions, recognizing the injustice, have instead allowed plaintiffs to recover
for enhanced risk on a lesser standard, but only when accompanied by gross physical
injuries of the sort not typically present in toxic exposure cases. See Carson, supra note
24, at 639-40.
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that event, they are thus significantly under-compensated for the extent of
their injuries, but are able to receive some compensation before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Or, they may choose to wait until
the actual manifestation of illness to bring suit, thus suffering the same
problems of the passage of time discussed above, 'namely statute of
limitations, loss of critical evidence, difficulty in identifying liable parties,
etc.27 Some courts have even expressed concern about the occurrence of
the former situation as a justification for disallowing recovery for
increased risk at all. 28 Either way, while the concept of increased risk is
progress for toxic exposure victims, the actual application and
management of the concept thereof by the judicial system has done little to
advance true redress.
Medical monitoring. Medical monitoring, or medical surveillance,
"is a claim for the post-exposure, pre-symptom compensation of future
periodic medical examinations, designed to facilitate early detection and
diagnosis of exposure-related diseases." 29  Medical monitoring claims
have enjoyed an arguably more successful introduction to the judicial
arena than the other novel torts, seemingly because they are based on an
easily cognizable and substantially less speculative injury.31 Thus, "courts
are ignoring the absence of injury and allowing plaintiffs to recover the
reasonable cost of medical testing on the legal basis of the plaintiffs right
to recover for reasonably anticipated future medical expenses. ' 32 Some
courts have concluded that this recovery just makes plain and equitable
sense.
33
27 See id. at 644 (discussing the detrimental effects of delayed suit on plaintiffs' cases).
28 See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(disallowing recovery for increased risk in part because those who later manifest the
disease to which they have an increased risk will be under-compensated). The court also
noted that those who fail to manifest the disease will have received a financial windfall,
id., but this interpretation is flawed in that it fails to recognize the increased risk as an
independent compensable injury.
29 Ann Taylor, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of Tort Law, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 753, 776 (1994).,
30 For an extensive list of jurisdictions recognizing, rejecting, and lacking case law on
medical monitoring causes of actions, see Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical
Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 Hous. L.
REv. 473, 489 n.100 (1996).
31 See id. at 483-84.
32 Id. at 486.
33See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that medical monitoring as a cause of action "accords with
[Vol. 26:67
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Unfortunately, courts have also found ways to limit the efficacy of
the medical monitoring cause of action. For example, courts have
required a discrete and direct exposure to the toxin,34 an increased risk of
serious injury, a present physical injury, 36 and specific methods for the
dispersion of the funds.37 These limitations unnecessarily limit the award
of damages where, intuitively, it seems they should "be included in a
damage award to the extent that in the past, they were medically advisable
and, in the future, will probably remain so." 38 However, implicit in that
statement is the idea that medical monitoring costs should be included in a
damage award, not constitute the entirety thereof. That is the fundamental
shortcoming of the medical monitoring cause of action, and probably a
large reason for its judicial success-it in no way compensates toxic tort
victims for their injury. Rather, it subtly dissuades the victims from
believing that they have suffered a harm at all, shifting the focus back to
the development of a "real" injury-a "physical, visible, or discem[i]ble"
one 3--much like traditional tort law and its inability or disinclination to
recognize the true harm of toxic exposure.4 °
Property damage. Interestingly, toxic exposure claims centered
on, or at least akin to, property damage have met with greater success.
The claims have most often taken on two forms: true property damage
and decreased quality of life. The property claims often have a nuisance-
like ring; touting the right to use one's property free from interference and
commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which underlie the common law of
tort").
34 See, e.g., Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724 (N.J. 1993) (limiting the broad
scope of Ayers v. Township of-Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), so as not to apply to
the exposure suffered by the wife of an asbestos worker when she did the family
laundry).
35See, e.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993) (requiring
multiple elements, including increased risk, before allowing recovery for medical
monitoring costs).
36 See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1033 (1992) (wherein physical injury was required for recovery and mere exposure did
not create sufficient injury).
37See Jordan, supra note 30, at 493-94.
38 Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986), reh 'g denied
en banc and modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (awarding medical monitoring costs
to a tankerman accidentally drenched with carcinogenic dripolene).
39Levit, supra note 5, at 174.
40 The cumulative result of the judicial system's disinclination to confront and redress
these harms head-on is an informal immunity for those creating the risks of exposure at
the expense of those who are harmed. See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 3, at 850.
2001)
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
the commonly invoked maxim "sic utere tuo .. .,41 Courts seem to have
much less trouble extrapolating from their obligation to enjoin a feedlot
"polluting" nearby residents with noxious odor and flies, 42 to their similar
obligation to prevent toxic pollutants, than they do recognizing emotional
harms from the same pollution. In the same vein, where courts have
likened quality of life damages to tangible property rights damages,
recovery of damages has succeeded, even where the congruent emotional
distress damages were rejected.43
Summing Up. Several observations emerge from this quick tour of
toxic tort doctrine. First, many courts remain reluctant to allow recovery
for non-physical injury; they seem hesitant to conclude that emotional
injury, even if accompanied by physical symptoms of distress, is real, or at
least important, enough to justify judicial intervention. Second, courts
often tie judicial relief to the plaintiff's ability to prove not only that her
probability of physical illness can be quantified, but also that it rises to a
particular numerical level (often greater than fifty percent). Finally, some
courts-including, most prominently, the U.S. Supreme Court-have
explicitly distinguished between acute near-misses and latent risks, and
have held that recovery may be allowed in the former but not the latter
case. As we shall see, each of these features of current doctrine misses the
important lessons to be learned from the large and growing psychological
and sociological literature on risk.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF RISK
Consulting research on risk and risk perception in the fields of
psychology and sociology yields a treasure trove of insights relevant to
toxic tort law. Specifically, people care a lot about risk even before they
die or fall ill from it; they care about much more than the numerical
probability of harm; and they reserve a special dread for latent risks. All
41 A person may not use their property in such a way as to interfere with others' use and
enjoyment of their own property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
42 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
43 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (clearly distinguishing
between subjectively measured damages for "pain and suffering" and those property-like
damages that objectively affect quality of life such as the inability to use the water supply
where the town's landfill contaminated the local water supply).
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of these insights into people's reactions to risk make current tort doctrine
regarding toxic exposures look confused and ignorant, even backward.44
A. Risk as an Injury
Studies of individuals and communities that have lived through
exposure to long-lived risk have revealed profound and adverse effects
from such exposures. Sociologist Kai Erikson explains:
The experience of trauma, at its worst, can mean not only a
loss of confidence in the self but a loss of confidence in the
scaffolding of family and community, in the structures of
human government, in the larger logics by which
humankind lives, and in the ways of nature itself.47
Within families and among neighbors, long-lived threats have often
produced disagreements and divides that did not exist before the
threatening exposures occurred. Recurring problems include family
disputes over whether to move away from the area where the exposures
occurred or are occurring, and disputes among neighbors over whether to• 46join legal or political efforts to combat the risks.
In addition, many researchers have found that one of the most
dramatic effects of long-lived environmental threats is a loss of trust.
Indeed, virtually all case studies of "contaminated communities," as
Michael Edelstein calls them, have found a generalized loss of trust in
society's institutions.47 This mistrust extends, most obviously, to the
44 This Part draws heavily on Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present
Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999), reprinted in 31 LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 305
2000) (reprinted as one of the best environmental law articles of 1999).
5 ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 242.46 See, e.g., Margaret S. Gibbs, Psychopathological Consequences of Exposure to Toxins
in the Water Supply, in 6 ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: EXPOSURE TO
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES: PSYCHOLOGICAL PARAMETERS 47, 52 (Allen H. Lebovits et
al. eds. 1986) [hereinafter ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY]; Adeline G.
Levine & Russell A. Stone, Threats to People and What They Value: Residents'
Perceptions of the Hazards of Love Canal, in 6 ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra, at 109, 125; ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 122-28.
47See, e.g., MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDUAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 70-82 (1998); Bruce P.
Dohrenwend, Psychological Implications of Nuclear Accidents: The Case of Three Mile
Island, 59 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1060 (1983); PHIL BROWN & EDWIN J. MIKKELSEN,
NO SAFE PLACE: TOXIC WASTE, LEUKEMIA, AND COMMUNITY ACTION 118-20 (1990);
2001]
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entities directly responsible for the threat, but it also reaches the local,
state, and federal government entities deemed responsible for reacting to
the threat. Indeed, in some cases, citizens have lost more faith in the
government than in the polluter.48  This loss of trust can have severe
effects on citizens' relationship with their government and thus, in a
participatory government like ours, on the functi6ning of government
itself.4? And, once lost, trust is hard to restore.
5 0
The loss of trust experienced as a result of environmental
contamination is connected to the long-term nature of environmental
threats.. The longevity of these threats increases the uncertainty associated
with them, as years may pass before the exposed community learns the
full consequences of their exposure.5' This uncertainty puts the
government and' other institutions involved in disclosing and explaining
the threat in the position of wanting to say something about the threat,
without having very much that they can say.5 2  The dilemma is well
illustrated in the following statement by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency regarding dioxin exposures in Missouri: "Dioxin in
Missouri may present one of the greatest environmental problems in the
Kenneth M. Bachrach & Alex J. Zautra, Assessing the Impact of Hazardous Waste
Facilities: Psychology, Politics, and Environmental Impact Statements, in ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 46, at 71, 84 (discussing a hazardous waste
facility in Arizona); Gibbs, supra note 46, at 52 (examining toxic water contamination in
Legler section of Jackson Township, New Jersey); ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 129-33
(discussing a leaking underground gas tank in East Swallow, Colorado); Levine & Stone,
supra note 46, at 127 (discussing Love Canal); MARTHA R. FOWLKES & PATRICIA Y.
MILLER, LOVE CANAL: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISASTER (1982).
48 See, e.g., EDELSTEIN, supra note 47, at 80-81 (describing citizens' reactions to events
at Love Canal).
49See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675
1i993).
Id. at 677; see also Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear
Waste, 254 SCIENCE 1603, 1606 (1991); Dohrenwend, supra note 47, 1071-72 (finding
high levels of distrust among the residents living near the Three Mile Island nuclear
reactor, stemming from the accident there; distrust did not dissipate after the accident, as
mental distress did).
51 Cf. Robin Pope, The Pre-Outcome Period and the Utility of Gambling, in
FOUNDATIONS OF UTILITY AND RISK THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS 137, 157 (Brent P.
Stigum & Fred Wenstop eds., 1983) (arguing that having a concept of uncertainty is
impossible without having a concept of time).
EDELSTEIN, supra note 47, at 77.
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history of the United States. Conversely, it may not. 53 In the absence of
information about the actual physical effects of po1lution-which, with
long-term threats, may not be available for many years, if ever-people
are forced to come to their own conclusions about the risks they face. The
"nonempirical belief systems," as Henry Vyner has called them, that are
formed in the absence of empirical information may consist either of
denying any threat, or fearing the worst.54 Government often embraces
the former conviction, 55 citizens the latter. This divergence. creates fertile
space for mistrust within communities.
Of course, communities can be destroyed by short-lived threats,
too. Kai Erikson himself has produced one of the most famous accounts
of the devastating effects an acute disaster-a flood--can have on a
community's sense of itself.5 6 But latent threats are special in this sense:
they can convert what would otherwise be a discrete, diffuse kind of
harm--one death here, another there-into a catastrophe that tears the web
of a whole community. When. an exposed community will not know for
many years whether anyone will fall ill or die as a result of their exposure,
when, indeed, they may never know whether the illnesses and deaths they
53 Id. at 76 (quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov. 14, 1983)). Anastasia Shkilnyk
quotes an equally memorable governmental statement, this one from a letter to members
of an Ojibwa band in Canada, whose river had been contaminated with mercury:
Your level of mercury was found to be __ parts per billion .... Most of
the band members have mercury levels that are higher than the people
living in southern Ontario who do not eat very much fish, but this is to
be expected, and the mercury level does vary from person to person
without necessarily having any effect on their health. We consider
your mercury level to be in the range of measurements which would
not affect your-health.
We realize that the matter of mercury in the, fish is a difficult
one to understand and the experts are still learning more about mercury
and its effects, but it is also important to remember that to keep healthy,
it is necessary to eat balanced meals which contain some meat or fish as
well as starch foods such as bread, and fats such as margarine or butter.
ANASTASIA M. SHKILNYK, A POISON STRONGER THAN LOVE 210-11 (1985).
54See generally HENRY M. VYNER, INVISIBLE TRAUMA: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
OF INVISIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS (1988).
55 See, e.g., Lee Clarke, Politics and Bias in Risk Assessment, 25 Soc. Sci. J. 155, 161
(1988) (government officials often defend risky systems even more adamantly after a
disaster has occurred); VYNER, supra note 54, at 182-88 (asserting that invisibility of
environmental threats allows government to deny their seriousness).
KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976).
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experience came from the exposure or from something else,57 the whole
community becomes involved in the threat of death--even if, ultimately,
only a handful of illnesses and deaths will reasonably be attributed to the
exposure they fear. A long temporal lag between exposure and physical
effects can thus transform a diffuse and individual harm into a collective
harm, a disaster.58 Prolonged enough, risk itself becomes the disaster.
The social and psychological reactions we have described have
been consistently reported by people who have lived through exposure to
long-lived environmental threats. 9 These include the famous events at
Three Mile Island, Love Canal, and Times Beach, and less well-known
toxic episodes in places like Woburn, Massachusetts; Hardeman County,
Tennessee; and Legler, New Jersey. One might say, in fact, that the set of
reactions we have described is so strikingly similar from place to place,
and so intimately tied to the N ecial nature of toxic exposures, that they
comprise a kind of syndrome. Perhaps the most vivid expression of the
clustering of the rather disparate reactions we have described, and their
association with toxic exposures, is the "demoralization scale" developed
by Bruce Dohrenwend-who led the task force on behavioral and mental
health effects as part of the President's Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island-and his colleagues.6 1  The demoralization scale, a
measure of "nonspecific stress, ' 62 includes feelings of sadness, depression,
57 Many environmental contaminants pose the problem of what Henry Vyner calls
"etiological invisibility," that is, the cause of a particular health effect cannot be isolated.
Ionizing radiation, for example, leaves no "marker" that distinguishes leukemias caused
b it from leukemias caused by something else. VYNER, supra note 54, at 15-16.
Cf ALLEN H. BARTON, COMMUNITIES IN DISASTER: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
COLLECTIVE STRESS SITUATIONS 38 (1969) (defining disasters as "collective stress
situations ... [in which] many members of a social system fail to receive expected
conditions of life from the system... includ[ing] the safety of the physical environment,
protection from attack, provision of food, shelter, and income, and guidance and
information necessary to carry on normal activities") (emphasis omitted).
59For an excellent summary of these effects, see Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing
in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach
to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1137-46 (1994).
60 Cf VYNER, supra note 54, at 121-40 (describing features of what author calls
"radiation response syndrome," a collection of symptoms found among veterans exposed
to radiation during testing of atomic bombs).
61 See Bruce P. Dohrenwend et al., Stress in the Community: A Report to the President's
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 365 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 159
(1981). Dohrenwend attributes their use of the term "demoralization" to Jerome Frank.
See Dohrenwend, supra note 47, at 1065 (citing J.D. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING
1973)).
2 See Dohrenwend, supra note 47, at 1067.
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loneliness, and anxiety; nervousness; restlessness; sour stomach; poor
appetite; cold sweats; headaches; generalized physical ailments; and
helplessness, hopelessness, uselessness, and failure.63  Populations
exposed to various toxic episodes have been found to score "high" on the
demoralization scale as compared to other populations, including the
clients of mental health centers.64 Demoralization is a compact way of
describing a large part of the cluster of social and psychological responses
common to toxic exposures.
In short, risk matters to people, and it matters long before the date
on which a person subject to a hazard may fall ill or die as a result of it.
Indeed, the entire current literature on the monetary value of a human life
takes this as given: this literature seeks to identify, not the value a person
places on life itself, but the value she places on small increases (or
reductions) in risk of death.65 The empirical evidence purporting to find,
for example, that workers accept higher wages in return for accepting
small increases in risk makes no sense unless risk itself is a kind of
commodity, separate and apart from life itself, as no one is suggesting that
workers would accept a finite sum of money in exchange for certain
death.66 While there is much reason to question the specific valuations
found in the wage premium studies that have been done to date,67 there is
little reason to question the basic premise that people conceive increased
risk (or decreased risk) as a real cost (or benefit) to themselves. This
premise is supported by other kinds of empirical evidence as well. It often
happens, for example, that the property values of homes surrounding
sources of environmental hazards, such as toxic waste sites, decrease as a
result of these hazards, and researchers have found that decreases in value
63 See Jeffrey S. Markowitz & Elane M. Gutterman, Predictors of Psychological Distress
in the Community Following Two Toxic Chemical Incidents, in ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 46, at 89, 95 tbl.6.2. •
64 See, e.g., id. at 103; Bachrach & Zautra, supra note 47, at 79, 83-85. As Bruce
Dohrenwend puts it, "High scores on this symptom scale are in some ways analogous to
body temperature: when it goes up, one knows something is wrong." Dohrenwend, supra
note 47, at 1067-69.
65 See, e.g., W. Kip VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 45 (Clarendon Press 1998).
66 See, e.g., JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION:
How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 27 (1988).
67 The critiques of the late economist Don Shakow are particularly illuminating and
incisive. See, e.g., Don Shakow, Market Mechanisms for Compensating Hazardous
Work: A Critical Analysis, in EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 277
(Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983); Julie Graham & Don Shakow, Hazard Pay for Workers:
Risk and Reward, 23 ENV'T. 14 (Oct. 1981); Julie Graham et al., Risk Compensation-in
Theory and in Practice, 25 ENV'T. 14 (Jan./Feb. 1983).
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correspond to perceptions of increased risk.68 Thus, risk is sufficiently
concrete, in and of itself, to have a value in the marketplace. Indeed, this
insight is the basic foundation of the institution of insurance.
69
Other common behaviors also suggest that risk itself is a
consequential event in people's lives. In many cases, people choose
where to live, 70 where to work,71 and even where to play" based on the
risks they face. Sometimes risk even affects the decision whether to have
children.73 Risk also influences what people eat,74 what they drink,75 and
68 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Douglas Easterling, Gaining Acceptance for Noxious
Facilities with Economic Incentives, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RISK:
POLICY FORMULATION IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 151, 155 (Daniel W. Bromley &
Kathleen Segerson eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE SOCIAL RESPONSE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK]. See also ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 116 n.* (reporting that one family's home had
been declared to have "no value" due to a leaking underground storage tank).
69 See, e.g., WARREN FREEDMAN, 1 FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON INSURANCE 12 (6th ed.
1990) (describing nature of insurance in way that. makes it closely resemble nature of
environmental risk: insurance involves risk of "real loss" that insured and insurer cannot
either "avert or hasten;" a large number of persons are subject to the same risk; the loss
itself is likely to fall on a relatively small part of the larger group; the probabilities of
harm must be capable of estimation; the loss must be "sufficiently considerable ... to be
worth providing against;" and the cost of providing against the loss must not be
"7grohibitive").
See, e.g., Valerie Preston et al., Adjustment to Natural and, Technological Hazards: A
Study of an Urban Community, 15 ENV'T. & BEHAVIOR 143, 160-61 (1983) (finding that
twelve percent of residents of a community exposed to various technological risks had
attempted to relocate in response to the risks, and that one-third of the residents had
considered relocating).
71 See, e.g., W. Kip VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 67 (1983) (finding that "workers' risk perceptions had a powerful influence
on their intentions [and propensities] to quit"); cf. Allen H. Lebovits et al., The Case of
Asbestos-Exposed Workers: A Psychological Evaluation, in ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 46, at 3, 15 (finding that asbestos workers
stayed in trades involving significant asbestos exposure despite knowledge of hazards
associated with asbestos).
72 See, e.g., ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 156.
See, e.g., BROWN & MIKKELSEN, supra note 47, at 95; VYNER, supra note 54, at 48;
Donald G. Unger et al., Living Near a Hazardous Waste Facility: Coping with Individual
and Family Distress, 62 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 55, 57 (1992).
74See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 527 (2d ed.
1996) (reporting "rapid decline in apple consumption" following television report on the
risks of Alar, a growth regulator used on apples); SHKILNYK, supra note 53, at 202-03
(describing effects of mercury contamination of river on community's consumption of
fish).
For a detailed account of the effect on daily life of being advised not to drink or use
one's tap water, see EDELSTEIN, supra note 47, at 34-37.
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how and where they bathe.76  An increase in risk, in brief, constrains
options along a broad spectrum of human choice, from home, to work, to
family, to daily habits of living.
In light of this evidence of the serious and profound consequences
of prolonged exposures to toxic risks, courts' rather casual rejection of, or
severe limitations on, legal claims arising out of such exposures seems
ignorant, or even callous.
B. Counting More Than Numbers
The kinds of risks posed by exposures to toxic substances seem to
strike a singular kind of fear in the hearts of ordinary citizens.7 7 This fear
often does not correspond very well with numerical probabilities of
physical illness and death.78 To give one famous example, ordinary
people tend to view nuclear power as a much riskier activity than medical
X-rays, even though people who are experts in assessing risk believe that
the numerical probability of illness and death from X-rays is higher than it
is from nuclear power.79 The risk perceptions of experts, too, are affected
by other factors besides numerical probabilities of harm, but less so, it
seems, than those of lay citizens.80
The discrepancy between lay and expert perceptions of risk, and
more specifically, between lay perceptions of risk and numerical
probabilities of physical harm, has led to concerted efforts to understand
the reasons for the divergence. Many researchers have concluded that at
least part of the divergence between lay and expert, or nonstatistical and
76 See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 978 n.2 (1993);
EDELSTEIN, supra note 47, at 29, 36.
77 Some critics of environmental regulation point to citizens' fears as a cause of the
regulatory problems they perceive. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of
Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
78 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 282 (1987).
79 Id. at 281; Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
SOCIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181, 192-93 (Richard C.
Schwing & Walter A. Alberts, Jr. eds., 1980).
80 Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski et al., Effects of Expertise and Experience on Risk
Judgments, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 278 (1983), discussed in Lola L. Lopes, Risk
Perception and the Perceived Public, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK, supra note 68, at 57, 61; Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science:
Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 68-69, 83-87. Of
course, the statistical probabilities themselves, on which many experts mostly rely for
formulating their judgments about risk, are usually pervaded by nontechnocratic biases
and assumptions. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 55, at 155; Lopes, supra, at 71.
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statistical, views of risk arises from laypeople's tendency to take a wider
set of considerations into account in judging risk. The list of these
considerations is quite large: the controllability, familiarity, immediacy,
diffuseness, voluntariness, equity, reversibility, and naturalness of the
hazard-or the opposite of these characteristics-all appear to be
important in shaping ordinary people's perceptions of risk.8 ' Ordinary
people also appear to care a great deal about whether a hazard threatens
only this generation, or also future generations, and appear to perceive the
latter as riskier than the former.82 In making judgments about risk, lay
citizens also tend to consider the benefits they perceive to stem from the
risky substance or activity.
83
Here, too, courts' responses to the diverse claims raised by toxic
tort plaintiffs seem out of step with the latest interdisciplinary work. In
particular, courts' preoccupation with the numerical probabilities of harm
in cases alleging harm based on increased risk begs the underlying
question of what risk means.
C. Latency and Risk
Citizens' anxieties about a particular substance or activity do not
appear to depend on the immediacy of the physical harm that might be
caused by it. Indeed, sometimes there appears to be an inverse
relationship between anxiety and immediacy. To perceive more risk from
hazards that pose threats to future generations than from ones that threaten
this generation alone, for example, is to reserve a special dread for the
remote threat of harm.
Less obviously, considerations such as equity, controllability,
knowability, and reversibility also have a large temporal dimension. A
long passage of time between the imposition of a risk and the
manifestation of physical harm makes inequity more likely, as those who
benefited from the risk are less likely to be around to suffer its adverse
consequences. In addition, it is harder to control and to know a threat
81 See Christensen-Szalanski et al., supra note 80, at 283; WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF
ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 87 fig.3-1 (1976);
Robin Gregory & Robert Mendelsohn, Perceived Risk, Dread, and Benefits, in 13 RISK
ANALYSIS 259 (1993) (using regression techniques to identify major explanatory
variables for risk perceptions reported by laypeople in other studies).
82 Gregory & Mendelsohn, supra note 81, at 261.
83 Id. at 262; Slovic, supra note 80, at 81 & nn.65-67.
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whose consequences cannot be perceived until many years after one acts.84
One's ability to engage in trial and error-and thus to learn about and to
control a hazard-is severely undermined by a large temporal gap between
the trial and the error.85 It is also more difficult to reverse a threat that has
been many years in the making,86 and that arises-as many risks from
toxic substances do-from durable agents that, once unleashed, persist in
the environment and in living tissue for many years.
87
There is also a temporal element in citizens' tendency to consider
the benefits of an activity in judging its riskiness. 88  Put simply, latent
hazards pack no thrill. The chance, for example, that exposure to a
chemical will lead to a diagnosis of cancer a quarter-century hence just
does not match up to the high-adventure, high-adrenaline possibility of
dying immediately in a spectacular skiing, boating, or motorcycle
accident. 89 Part of the reason why people enjoy activities like skiing and
motorcycling is that they are risky, and immediately so. 90 If all goes well,
84 VYNER, supra note 54, at 14-18 (arguing that environmental contaminants that are
"invisible" for a long period due to latency of diseases caused by them are less amenable
to adaptation and control by people exposed to such contaminants).
85 Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1077, 1107 (1990). See also Laura M. Davidson et al., Toxic Exposure and
Chronic Stress at Three Mile Island, in ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 46, at 35, 44 (claiming that uncertainty about future consequences of past
exposures to harmful agents may increase perceptions of loss of control).
86 See Michael Gaffney & Bernard Altshuler, Public Health Implications of
Carcinogenic Exposure Under the Multistage Model, 124 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1021,
1029 (1986) (arguing that because early-stage carcinogens take longer to do their harmful
work, many years of exposure will be accumulated by the time epidemiological studies
reveal their harmful consequences, and at that point, it is too late to repair the damage
that has been done).
LOWRANCE, supra note 81, at 93-94.
88 There is a spatial element, too, in many of the nonstatistical features of risk that
laypeople deem important; specifically, many of these features are related to territoriality.
See Michael B. Gerrard, Territoriality, Risk Perception, and Counterproductive Legal
Structures: The Case of Waste Facility Siting, 27 ENVTL. L. 1017 (1997).
89 Such accidents are in the lowest quartile of hazards scored according to Slovic's scale
of dread and unknown risks. Slovic, supra note 78, at 2832 fig.1.
90 As Ralph Keyes has written:
Only an actual masochist enjoys danger as such. Yet we all enjoy its
by-products: alertness, intensity, and a sense of elation once danger has
passed. With its faster pulse, shortness of breath, and copious
perspiration, the body responds to moderate stress much as it does to
physical exercise .... As with exercise, short doses of tolerable stress
are essential for keeping body and spirit tuned .... But it must be
emphasized that this means occasional stress at tolerable levels. There
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one's payoff is immediate: one returns home safe and sound the same day,
having experienced at once the thrill of danger and the thrill of mastering
it.91  Almost simultaneously with experiencing the risk itself, one
experiences (again, if all goes well) the certainty of having survived it
intact.92 With latent risks, one must wait years for such assurance.
93
This lack of early assurance distinguishes even the unwelcome
immediate threat (such as a hurricane or flood) from the latent one, and
helps to explain why a special anxiety might be reserved for hazards
whose physical consequences are remote. As Kai Erikson has written:
One reason toxic emergencies provoke such
concern is that they are not bounded, that they have no
is little good to be said for even occasional panic, constant phobias, or
nagging anxiety.
RALPH KEYES, CHANCING IT: WHY WE TAKE RISKS 35 (1985).
91 Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, in 20 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 288 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1987) (citing
KEYES, supra note 90,. at 115 (observing of people who pursue risky professions or
hobbies: "[I]t's not adventure they're after. It's mastery.")); KEYES, supra 90, at 41, 62
(explaining that among "Level I" risk takers (people who engage in "highly stimulating,
exciting activities that are often dangerous and seldom last very long," such as "thrill
sports"), a common stated reason for this risk-taking is the ability to take charge over
one's life). See also Paula Horvath & Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking, Risk
Appraisal, and Risky Behavior, 14 PERS. INDIVID. DIFF. 41, 41 (1993).
Why do high sensation seekers take risks while low sensation seekers
avoid activities which are risky? One reason may be that the high
sensation seekers value the rewards of the activities more than the low
sensation seekers. The sensations of free-fall for a parachutist, the
"rush" of heroin or the "high" of cocaine, the wind in the face and the
blur of the scenery for the accelerating motorcyclist, the fast beating
heart of the gambler waiting for the outcome of the bet, the excitement
of sex, all seem to provide forms of arousal that are more valued by
high sensation seekers than by lows. The intense reward effects of such
activities may outweigh the risks for the high sensation seekers.
Id.
92 KEYES, supra note 90, at 65 (discussing thrill-seekers reporting that one of the main
rewards of risk-taking is "the calm that follows" the danger). Cf. Viscusi, supra note 65,
at 15-16 (1998) (claiming that people are willing to a pay "certainty premium" to be
assured of zero risk, over and above the amount they would be willing to pay for similar
reductions in risk that achieve nonzero levels of risk); see also Lopes, supra note 91, at
278 (discussing the "seemingly special status of certainty in risky choice").
93See, e.g., VYNER, supra note 54, at 55-57. For a critique of expected utility theory on
the ground that it ignores the length of time between a decision to take (or not to take) a
risk and the resolution of uncertainty with respect to that risk, see Pope, supra note 51;
see also Lopes, supra note 91, at 289-91.
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frame. We generally use the word "disaster" in everyday
conversation to refer to a distinct event that interrupts the
accustomed flow of everyday life. "Disasters" seem to
adhere to Aristotle's rules of drama. They have "a
beginning and a middle and an end."... They have plot, in
short, which is "the first principle and as it were the soul of
tragedy."
An alarm sounds the beginning. It is a signal to
retreat, to take to storm cellars, to move to higher ground,
to crouch in the shelter of whatever cover presents itself. A
period of destruction then follows that may take no more
than a brief, shattering moment or may last many days.
Sooner or later, though, the disaster comes to an exhausted
close. The floodwaters recede, the smoke clears, the winds
abate, the bombers leave, and an all clear is sounded either
literally or figuratively....
Toxic disasters, however, violate all the rules of
plot. Some of them have clearly defined beginnings, such
as the explosion that signaled the emergency at Chernobyl
or the sudden moment of realization that opened the drama
of Bhopal; others begin long years before anyone senses
that something is wrong, as was the case at Love Canal.
But they never end. Invisible contaminants remain a part
of the surroundings, absorbed into the grain of the
landscape, the tissues of the body, and worst of all, the
genetic material of the survivors. An all clear is never
sounded. The book of accounts is never closed.94
"Chronic disasters" is the name Erikson gives to the cumulative, insidious,
and gradual harm that is characteristic of so many environmental
problems.95 That the term at first seems oxymoronic-as if an emergency
could last a lifetime-just shows how large the gap is between explicit
intuitions about time and risk (surely, one thinks, perceptions of risk must
decrease with the time it takes for a physical harm to occur), and the
94 ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 147-48 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POETICS 29-31 (W.
Hamilton Fyre trans., 1932)). See also EDELSTEIN, supra note 47, at 9 (1988) ("A sense
of finality is elusive for the toxic victim, in part because toxic disasters lack a 'low point'
from which things would be expected to improve.") (citations omitted).
95 ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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widespread, probably mostly unconscious amplification of perceived
riskiness with time.
96
Latent hazards provoke another kind of psychological response as
well. Latency is, simply, dormancy, and dormancy in this context refers to
a condition in which a harmful agent, or the beginning of disease itself, is
present but invisible. Latency thus creates a sense of contamination, of
slow and invisible poison. Many people reserve a special dread for this
kind of hazard. Again, Kai Erikson's work is illuminating. Toxic
substances, he writes:
invert the process by which disasters normally inflict harm.
They do not charge in from outside and batter like a gust of
wind or a wall of water. They slink in without warning, do
no immediate damage so far as one can tell, and begin their
deadly work from within-the very embodiment, it would
seem, of stealth and treachery ... . Toxic poisons provoke
a special dread because they contaminate, because they are
undetectable and uncanny and so can deceive the body's
alarm systems, and because they can become absorbed into
the very tissues of the body and crouch there for years,
even generations, before doing their deadly work.
9 7
In interviews with people who lived near the nuclear reactor at Three Mile
Island when it experienced the nation's worst nuclear power accident to
date, Erikson discovered a widespread sense of the kind of contamination
he describes: people feared that radiation from the power plant had
infiltrated their bodies, their genes, their houses, yards, and gardens. 98
Simple events-like "grandchildren romping in [one's] backyard" 9 9 -had
become laced with dread.' 00
96For other accounts sounding the same theme, see, for example, EDELSTEIN, supra note
47; BROwN & MIKKELSEN, supra note 47.
97 Kai Erikson, Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear, 68 HARV. Bus.
REv. 118, 122 (1990).
98 Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
10oThe sense that one's body, and indeed all of nature, has become contaminated is a
common response to toxic exposures. See, e.g., SHKILNYK, supra note 53, at 205
(reporting one woman's response to mercury poisoning in the lake in her community:
"People have been trusting the fish for many years, and suddenly you don't know
whether to trust them any more").
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The special anxieties associated with toxic substances can have
large effects on the lives of individuals and communities. Individuals who
have been exposed to substances whose physical effects likely will not
become manifest for years, perhaps decades, have reported a wide range
of adverse psychological responses to their potentially harmful exposures,
including anxiety and anguish about their future health,'
0
' depression,'0 2
and physical conditions linked to their emotional distress, such as fatigue
and insomnia,10 3 headaches, diarrhea, and muscle pain.'0 4 These anxieties
can also provoke hormonal and immunological changes that cause or
exacerbate many physical illnesses.'0 5 Although many of these responses
have taken place in the context of heightened cancer risk, a similar set of
responses has been reported by people who have been exposed to a risk of
other illnesses whose physical effects are not immediately manifest.1
0 6
101 See, e.g., ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 99-138; BROwN & MIKKELSEN, supra note 47, at
94-96. See also, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1986); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Day v. NLO,
Inc., 814 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516
(W.D. Mich. 1987); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986);
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (Cal. 1993); Laxton v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); Waldrop v. Vistron Corp., 391 So. 2d
1274 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1980).
102 See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 46, at 64; BROWN & MIKKELSEN, supra note 47, at 81-87.
See also, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. 1219; Stites, 660 F. Supp. i516; Wisner v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 537 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988).
103 See, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. 1219; Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887
(D. Minn. 1990).
104 See, e.g., Werlein, 746 F. Supp. 887.
105 Andrew Baum, Disasters, Natural & Otherwise, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1988, at 56,
60; see also Andrew Baum et al., Emotional, Behavioral, and Physiological Effects of
Chronic Stress at Three Mile Island, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL,
CLASSIC, AND CONTEMPORARY SELECTIONS 357 (Wayne A. Lesko ed., 1991)
(documenting the role of the Three Mile Island accident in increasing levels of stress-as
indicated by emotional, behavioral, and physiological measures-in the population
surrounding the nuclear power plant); Levit, supra note 5, at 180-88 (noting the effect of
hopelessness on levels of depression and suicide, incidence and spread of cancer, and the
immune system).
106 A large category of cases has involved people who suffer severe mental distress, and
the psychological, social, and physical consequences that come along with it, as a result
of exposure to the virus that causes AIDS. For general discussion, see Mandana
Shahvari, AfrAIDS: Fear of AIDS as a Cause of Action, 67 TEMPLE L. REv. 769 (1994).
Cf. Mary Donovan, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of Future
Consequences?, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1337, 1367-68 (1994) (discussing series of cases
brought by patients with defective artificial heart valves, who fear that at some unknown
future moment, they will suffer "sudden death" as a result of the defect in the valves).
2001 ]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Certainly, anxieties and anxiety-based disorders are not limited to
the context of latent harms. Anxiety-based tort claims, in fact, first
developed in cases in which people suffered mental distress as a
consequence of acute near-misses, such as barely escaping being run over
by a train.10 7 There is a difference between these two classes of cases,
however, and it has to do with the reasons why latent harms might
provoke special anxieties in the first place: whereas a person involved in a
near-miss with a train or a car knows immediately that she is safe, the
person exposed to substances whose physical consequences become
manifest only after a period of years cannot find the peace of mind that
comes with the assurance of safety. Where there is no early test available
to detect the presence (or absence) of disease in a person exposed to a
disease-bearing agent, only time will tell whether the person will become
sick.'08
In sum, the emerging legal distinction between acute and chronic
risks, and the awarding of recovery in tort for fear engendered by the
former but not the latter, 10 9 has it exactly backwards, as it is precisely the
person who does not yet know she is safe who has the most reason to be
fearful. A veteran exposed to radiation during atomic testing described the
awful uncertainty engendered by latent risk in this way: "the worst would
be better than this.' ' r
III. CONCLUSION: A TORT FOR Toxics
We believe that if courts took seriously the psychological and
sociological literature we have just described, they would be in a position
to reconceptualize post-exposure, pre-illness, toxic tort claims in the
following three ways.
First, courts could see that the human stakes in these toxic tort
cases are not tied in some linear fashion to the numerical probabilities of
harm associated with toxic exposures. Courts should decouple their
107 See, e.g., Mack v. South-Bound R.R. Co., 52 S.C. 323 (1898); see also Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430-33 (1997) (citing relevant cases).
108 Cf. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 632 (Ct. App. 1993); Faya v. Almaraz,
620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs' recovery for mental distress
arising from exposure to the AIDS virus was limited to the period during which they had
not yet received test results indicating they were HIV-negative).
109 See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 430 (disallowing tort recovery for mental distress
caused by "simple physical contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a
substantially later time").110 VYNER, supra note 54, at 57.
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analysis of claims based on emotional distress and increased risk from the
specific numerical probabilities of harm posed by a particular exposure.
Certainly, courts should not require that serious physical illness is more
probable than not as a result. of these exposures in order to find that such
exposures deserve judicial redress.
Second, courts should recognize that the diverse array of legal
claims that has arisen from toxic exposures really are all aimed at the same
kind of harm-the psychological, social, and medical consequences of
experiencing a dreadful risk. Negligent infliction of emotional distress is
the same as increased fear, and claims based on PTSD, and even claims
for enhanced risk and medical monitoring; properly conceptualized, these
are not separate legal theories. To the extent that these claims differ at all,
it is because they seek different kinds of damages, not because they reflect
different legal theories. This second suggestion would have the virtue of
"tidying up" the area of toxic tort law and bringing order to the confusing
profusion of claims that has characterized it.
Third, courts should recognize the post-exposure, pre-illness toxic
tort claim for what it really is: it is a claim based on an invasion of
autonomy and a denial of human dignity. It is not a subset of personal
injury law. Its closest relations are battery, assault, and trespass, and not
negligence and strict liability. An important limit on relief flows from this
relation, and should give comfort to those who worry that our proposed
new tort would soon flood the courts with trivial claims: that limit is that
some kind of enhanced intent-either reckless or knowing
endangerment-should be required for recovery under this new tort.
With these three adjustments, the law of toxic torts would begin to
absorb the lessons of the psychology and sociology of risk, -and would
begin to take seriously the human impulses motivating claims of toxic
torts.
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